Judge J. Michael Williamson Arrested For.. UPDATE!!

APPALLED AND AFFRONTED: Bon Bons For A SHAM RETIREMENT" A True and Faithful Account of the Judicial Perversions and  Stupefying Misconduct of President Judge, N. Philander Bilkson

The Furies (or is that the Ories?) Orie-Melvin Guilty!

http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/politics-state/jury-deliberating-orie-melvin-public-corruption-case-close-to-verdict-676334/#ixzz2LYpnD1MC One wonders what kind of "slap on the wrist" her she'll receive and how long it will take to have her impeached. Ten bucks says she won't be impeached!

Stay tuned!

Stay tuned for a factual update and critique of our illustrious Clinton County District Attorney Michael Salisbury's latest "faux pas" of the month! Coming to this Blog near you! ;)

JUDGE J. MICHAEL WILLIAMSON ARRESTED FOR DRUG RING INVOLVEMENT

DATELINE: April 1, 2012 — Lock Haven, Clinton County, PA.

President Judge J. Michael Williamson was taken from his chambers in handcuffs Friday morning, March 30th, 2012 by federal agents who arrested him for his involvement in a local drug ring. Although the judge had denied all allegations when similar drug charges surfaced several years ago—he had declared at the time that he was “appalled and affronted” that the FBI had been investigating him—a reliable source close to the current investigation has revealed that an unnamed participant in the drug ring is ready to swear under oath that he was the judge’s “mule,” ferrying him with large amounts of illegal substances for years.

“I’ve been waiting for this moment for nearly two decades,” stated a Lock Haven attorney, who asked that his name not be divulged for obvious reasons. “My legal confreres and I have been long laboring under the twisted lash of Judge Williamson’s arrogant, biased and vindictive decisions. We have found ourselves impotent in charging the judge with malfeasance for fear of his certain retaliation. When he ran for his position, he vowed that anyone who ran against him would suffer accordingly in his courtroom. Thus, he ran unopposed.”

Recognizing that they would be confronting an especially devious judge, the federal agents concocted a ruse to ensure that Judge Williamson would be in his chambers at the specific time designated for the arrest. They had flattered his legendary vanity by sending an announcement requiring him to make himself available for the presentation of the F. Foster Jenkins Memorial Award for Special Merit. He eagerly complied and was arrested on the spot only later learning the implications of the ruse. Not only was there no such award, but the bogus citation referred to Florence Foster Jenkins, generally agreed by music lovers to be the most execrable singer of classical music ever to foist herself upon the country’s concert halls.

Thus, the arrest was greeted by keen observers of the local judiciary in much the same manner that serious music lovers all over the world reacted to the news that Madame Jenkins would be terminating her lengthy career on the concert stage. As one observer put it: “You have to reach back to Jenkins’ unique career for an apt analogy that characterizes Judge Williamson’s distinctive contributions to the local judiciary.” Through the wonders of modern technology, here is a link to the renown singer demonstrating her special vocal talents as if in praise of the similar judicial achievements of Judge Williamson. In each case, neither singer nor judge has left any doubt as to how future generations will regard their characteristic performances. Here, their twin accomplishments sing out, as it were, with one voice, clear as a bell.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HJ5uZv1pG8g
(From the opera LAKME, Florence Foster Jenkins attacks THE BELL SONG, one of the most difficult songs in the classical repertoire.)

When asked to support his views of J. Michael Williamson’s judicial misconduct, the attorney quoted above cited several instances of malfeasance on the bench. “On August 4, 1999, two PA Supreme Court justices went on record with the following statement (in J-14-1998: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee, vs. Barry Eugene Taylor, Jr., Appellant): ‘[We are] compelled to write separately to voice [our] concerns relating to the conduct of the trial court [i.e., Judge Williamson] in this case…. [which] is so egregious as to require comment. Where, during the course of the proceedings in a criminal trial, the judge makes known his concern about the assumed credibility of the defendant and puts forth the threat of retaliation at sentencing should the defendant testify, such action could create a chilling effect on the entire process, which is to be fair, free and open…. Unfortunately, the record in this case does not permit this Court to entertain the underlying issues of the trial court’s predisposition as it relates to credibility and sentencing. However, rest assured that at its first opportunity, this Court will do that which is necessary to protect the criminal justice system in this Commonwealth.’ In other words, the justices implied that the state’s criminal justice system needed to be protected from the kind of judicial misconduct exhibited by Judge J. Michael Williamson in the above case.”

The attorney continued: “A more flagrant example of Judge Williamson’s reckless behavior and retaliatory nature surfaced in 2009 after a director of youth services had asked the Judicial Conduct Board to investigate Judge Williamson for misconduct when he was accused of grabbing the neck of a 16-year-old rape victim, who was the subject of a case over which he was presiding, and snarling at her not to make him ‘look bad’ in court. The judge’s egregious misbehavior in this instance came shockingly close to assault and battery. Most complaints before the JCB are dismissed without much if any ‘investigation.’ In fact, the Board received FORTY complaints about the corrupt former Luzerne County judges Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. and Michael T. Conahan during their careers but failed to act, finding that none of them warranted disciplinary action. These were the judges involved in the ‘kids-for-cash-kickback’ scandal that made Pennsylvania’s lax system for identifying and disciplining errant judges a world-wide laughing stock. However, the Williamson assault case was thoroughly investigated, resulting in the JCB’s issuing the judge a private reprimand—a statistical rarity and the Board’s most serious sanction short of filing charges in the Court of Judicial Discipline. A few months later, in a despicable act of retribution, Judge Williamson relieved the youth services director of his court-related duties for ‘contemptuous conduct’--refusing to meet with the judge in his chambers about their dispute over the disciplining of a probation officer and insisting that the judge meet with the director in his office and before witnesses of the director’s choice. Williamson deserves the contemptuous laughter of the gods for his accusing another of ‘contempt’ against him and his court while he himself indulges in unrelenting arrogant and contemptible behavior against those who come before him seeking the impartial administration of justice. Later, the director accused the judge of issuing a threat in a phone call concerning their dispute over the probation officer. Until the judge’s vindictive dismissal, the director had an unblemished record of over 38 years with court and social services.”

The attorney offered a more recent example, one to which the Judicial Conduct Board turned a deaf ear. “In a monstrous perversion of justice, J. Michael Williamson and his sycophantic junior judge, Craig P. Miller, separated a mother from her daughter on the totally unsubstantiated charges that the mother was an unfit parent and had been sexually abusing her daughter. (J-106- 2010) After the daughter had been subjected to numerous vaginal examinations that evidenced absolutely no abuse on the part of the mother, Judge Williamson detoured from his usually cretinous decisions in the case and finally ordered that there be no further such examinations. However, such a sane decision would not stand for long: Williamson later allowed ANOTHER such futile and harmful pelvic examination, thus demonstrating that not only does he ride roughshod over established law with his near-criminal exercise of ‘judicial discretion,’ but he couldn’t even follow HIS OWN ‘laws,’ so eager was he to wreak harm on the mother via her innocent child. Recognizing that she had no chance to rectify the situation as long as this judicial monster continued his tyrannical bias against her on the county bench, the mother moved out of state, hoping that this would at least prevent any more cruel vaginal examinations of her little girl. Not satisfied with what harm he himself could cause mother and child, Judge Williamson even suggested to the mother’s adversary that he have her arrested should she ever return to the county over which the judge presided. (Williamson feigned annoyance that the mother had “abandoned” her child when she left the state, but the real cause of his fury was that she had thus strategically removed herself from his tyrannical jurisdiction.) When she did return, she was arrested even though she had evidence on her that she had paid the fee that she had been accused of not having paid which supposedly justified the arrest. When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later commented on this aspect of the case, it noted: ‘several months after the July 11, 2007 hearing, Father acted on Judge Williamson’s advice and had Mother arrested and incarcerated overnight on the very next occasion he observed her in Clinton County. While it is not an appropriate subject for this opinion, it is not at all clear from the record that the arrest was justified.’

Once the judge had had his way with her in matters pertaining to custody, the mother was then turned over to Craig P. Miller, the President Judge’s sycophantic junior judge whose typical brown-nosing posture sets him forever sniffing at Williamson’s hindquarters in hopes that some gust of wisdom from his superior might guide his unsteady decisions. Miller presided over the termination proceedings, and, as the PA Supreme Court later declared: ‘Judge Miller, who in examining the totality of the circumstances of Mother’s “abandonment,” apparently did not consider the potential appearance of impropriety by Judge Williamson against Mother. Indeed, without addressing her allegations of bias, Judge Miller faulted Mother for wanting to wait until Judge Williamson’s retirement before again availing herself of the Pennsylvania court system.’ The Supreme Court thus saw through Judge Miller’s craven sycophancy when he continued Judge Williamson’s vicious campaign against the mother by terminating her parental rights to her daughter. But the Supreme Court reserved its harshest comments for Williamson’s contemptible behavior as it decreed that neither judge should be allowed to sit on any further legal proceedings connected with the case. The PA Supreme Court faulted Williamson for permitting ex parte communication from the Father; ignoring ‘repeated warnings from [County Youth Services] regarding the falsity of Father’s and Stepmother’s allegations of sexual abuse by Mother’; declaring in court that ‘information placed on an advocacy website by Mother (and / or Grandmother) was “garbage…and if you continue to publish this kind of stuff, you’ll never see this child again” ’; advising ‘Father to have Mother jailed “the next time you find her in Clinton County,” due to Mother’s alleged failure to pay child support’; and failing ‘to enforce [his own] orders barring further pelvic examinations of L.J.B. against Father / Stepmother.’ ”

“It would appear then that the Supreme Court had forever removed Judge Williamson from perverting his court to harm the mother,” the attorney commented, “but such is the judge’s petty vindictiveness that he couldn’t resist one final act of revenge. As he presided one day in his courtroom, he knew that the usual confusing information that often misled litigants about which courtroom their cases were to be heard in would mean that the mother was likely to walk innocently and mistakenly into his courtroom that day. Gleefully, he waited to pounce! As he noticed the other participants in the mother’s case wrongly gathering in his courtroom, he did not trouble to inform them of their error; instead he simply bided his time until he saw the mother enter. Then he YELLED at her to vacate HIS courtroom, but he was so eager to chastise her that he mistook her lookalike sister for the mother, and his attack fell on the wrong person in a perfect image of his own brand of ’justice’ being ‘blind.’ ”

No doubt, as he sits in his cell awaiting trial on the drug charges, J. Michael Williamson will still be calling the shots, Gotti-like, back in his Court of Common Pleas. After all, Judge Miller is incapable of handling his own cases until he sniffs the air to see which way Williamson wants the judicial winds to blow. Furthermore, the senior judge knows that for all their posturing, the PA Supreme Court is unlikely to turn against him in the long run. Just look at the jaw-dropping way in which they mitigated their criticism of him in the case of the judicially abused mother and daughter: “At worst,” the Supreme Court justices wrote, “the facts suggest the development of an outright bias by Judge Williamson against Mother. We, however, have deep respect for all of Pennsylvania jurists, and specifically decline to reach that conclusion on this record.” In other words, because we have blind faith in ALL PA judges (they just can’t be as BAD as their critics say, can they?), we can’t bring ourselves to accept a judgement against Williamson compelled by the facts before us. And thus in their folly, Chief Justice Ronald Castille and his fellow PA Supreme Court jesters join J. Michael Williamson in a state-wide Confederacy of Fools, not just on this one day in the year but throughout the entire year as they continue to protect their fellow miscreants on the bench while undermining the public’s confidence by permitting a corrupt and predatory judiciary to exist, to fester, and to thrive.

Clinton County Judicial Chicanery and Police Corruption

The Honorable Frank Mills, Magisterial District Judge
Magisterial District Court 25-3-03
130 Third Street
Renovo, PA, 17764

January 4, 2011

Subject: Your “no contact” Order of November 16, 2010 (Ref: (1)).

Ref: (1) The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs Jude Rene Montarsi 231-10 / 102924
Preliminary Hearing, November 16, 2010

Dear Mr. Mills:

While the main issue I want to address to you concerns your “no contact order,” I must digress a moment to take issue with your conclusion that the Commonwealth met its burden.

In reference to (Ref 1) above, at the conclusion of the proceeding, you stated, “I feel the Commonwealth in this case has met its burden.” Feeling is not you’re not paid to feel.

Near the conclusion of the hearing, District Attorney Salisbury stated: “Your Honor, the testimony is that she looked up, [with an] unobstructed view, 30 feet away, saw him put his hands on the gate and push it into her car. You can have either… I believe it’s absolutely intentional. We have the damage.” In the next breath, Salisbury commented, “…because we are at a preliminary hearing, this is not a matter of innocence or guilt. It’s whether a crime was committed. I think we’ve more than met our burden in this case.”

So you apparently accepted Salisbury’s fallacious reasoning that because damage occurred, it automatically followed as a result of a criminal act, calls into question your reputation as an impartial magistrate and perhaps even your motives for advancing this case against me.

The charge of “criminal mischief” against me did not result from a “private criminal complaint” filed by Tina Myers. Rather, it resulted from a “police criminal complaint” brought by PFC Kristin Sager and witnessed by her colleague, CPL Litzelman. Litzelman admitted me on the phone on August 31, 2010 that he took photos and assessed the “alleged” damage to the Myers’ vehicle. It seems to me I should have been afforded the opportunity to examine these officers before you jumped to your hasty conclusion that a “crime” occurred on July 27, 2010 as a result of damage to vehicle. So what testimony did they provide when they were mysteriously absent from my preliminary hearing (after the hearing date was changed twice in order to accommodate their schedules) that led you to conclude that Salisbury met his burden?

I have no criminal record and I have never sued anyone in civil court. But I am convinced beyond doubt that the Clinton County Judiciary—including the District Attorney—operates as a near-criminal enterprise. I have witnessed them breaking laws they have sworn to uphold and displaying a flagrant disregard for professional ethics. Now it seems, they are engaged in corrupting certain members of the city police force. Therefore, I understand completely why you and Mr. Salisbury have shielded Officers Sager and Litzelman from my right to cross-examine them in my preliminary hearing. By advancing this frivolous case, you may well have opened up a Pandora’s Box, leading to the possibility of a grand jury investigation into the growing concerns about public corruption in Clinton County and a federal civil rights lawsuit.

On the morning of November 17, 2010 I received a call from Attorney Boyle’s office to report to District Magistrate Joseph L. Saunders’ office to meet with an attorney from his staff. Mr. Boyle’s office informed me that I had to sign some papers pertaining to the bail. Mr. Boyle’s staff asked of Judge Saunders’ staff the reason why an attorney from Mr. Boyle’s office had to be present in Lock Haven. I don’t know the name of the staff-member involved in that communication from Mr. Saunders’ office, but, Attorney Boyle’s staff and the attorney who came from Harrisburg informed me that the person in Mr. Saunders’ office “refused” to provide a reason to Mr. Boyle’s office as to why the attorney’s presence was necessary.

When Mr. Boyle’s colleague arrived at Mr. Saunders’ office, she was still uninformed about the reason for her having to re-arrange her agenda and drive round trip from Harrisburg—using up five hours of her time. It turns out that it was solely to witness my signature on one form! Anyone could have witnessed my signature on that form! Five hours of that attorney’s time was wasted and billable to me—which in turn depleted the remaining assets in my account for my legal defense with Mr. Boyle’s firm.

Whether you were duped by your supervisors Williamson & Miller, Inc. (and that extends to include Salisbury) or that you simply chose to collude in this fraud, you have nevertheless involved yourself by advancing this case of malicious prosecution against me and have permitted your supervisors and the D.A. to continue with their years of barratry they have been inflicting on me. By the way, I got it from a reliable local county government source—a month before the preliminary hearing—that my case “is already decided” and that “I lost.”

Now I would like to shift your attention to the matter of the “no contact order” that you issued on November 16, 2010.

When you asked about setting bail, District Attorney Salisbury responded, “Your Honor, just simply that [a] no contact provision between the victim [notice the absence of the modifier “alleged”] and her husband…John—with the Defendant. I will instruct them that it will be reciprocal.” Mr. Boyle then said to you, “I guess our concern with that, Your Honor, since they’re next door neighbors, they’re going to see each other. By no contact, I assume that means no verbal, no physical contact.” And you said, “Right.”

On New Year’s Eve 2010, I hired new legal counsel to assist me in my defense of the case of criminal mischief that you have advanced. My new attorney, Mr. Holmes, directed me to provide him with some information to assist in his preparation of my defense. As the “alleged” criminal mischief of July 27, 2010 took place on my property, near the property of Tina and John Myers, it is important for me to have a visual aid—a panoramic photographic view—of the properties in order to best explain my information to Mr. Holmes.

A little before 1:00 PM on January 3, 2011, I went to my patio behind my house, set up a ladder and took some photographs of the area where there are fences and the driveway the Myers use are located, where the “alleged” criminal mischief occurred. I then climbed to the roof where I took a few panoramic shots of the yard area. When I finished, I looked down and I saw Tina Myers leering—LEERING—at me from her yard. Normally, I would have not bothered to pay attention. However, she kept leering at me and at one point, pulled up a camera to her face aiming it directly at me and presumably, she photographed me.

In view of your “no contact” Order, which Mr. Salisbury qualified with the term “reciprocal,” I decided to snap a photo of Myers with her camera aimed directly at me at approximately 1:03 PM—Refer to Enclosure (1)—to demonstrate to you, the contempt with which Tina Myers has openly displayed for your “no contact” order!

BAIL RELEASE CONDITIONS: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA VS. JUDE RENE MONTARSI

"Release Conditions: Defendant may not have any contact or communication whatsever with the victim, Tina Myers and John Myers."

My dictionary gives as a synonym for the noun “contact,” the word “communication.” By definition then, “to contact” is “to communicate.”

Harass is a transitive English verb that is derived from the French, harrasser, which is further derived from Middle French, meaning “to set or sic a dog upon,” further derived from the Old French, hare, used as an interjection “to incite dogs to attack.”

Your order apparently gives the “alleged” victim, Tina Myers a loophole to use non-verbal communication as a means to continue her harassment of me--on behalf of your supervisors and Mr. Salisbury. You must know that her sister was once married to Judge Miller’s brother. So the clever use of the word “reciprocal” by Mr. Salisbury, is just more evidence of the verbal chicanery being used to mask the improper motives that lie underneath your advancement of this case of malicious prosecution against me because I filed formal complaints against Williamson & Miller, Inc. with the JCB, ODC, and AG’s Office. Both you and I know well, that were I to pull such a prank, as did Tina Myers on January 3rd and had violated your “no contact order,” I’d be slapped with a contempt of court citation and fined and maybe even jailed!

In short, the essence of communication is intention and every act of communication, no matter what medium or how small, involves a form of premeditation. When Tina Myers stood leering at me from her yard on January 3rd and then put a camera to her face and pointed it at me, she was communicating something and it was premeditated! What do you think her intention was for this non-verbal communication—contact that you ordered not to take place?

Tina Myers had no legitimate reason to communicate with me. Her communication is just one more event in a series of harassing acts—often assisted by members of the City of Lock Haven Police Force—the latest one involving Lock Haven Police Officer Keith Kibler in early October 2010 in which she and Officer Kibler attempted to intimidate two of my witnesses for the upcoming trial.

To reiterate, while I do not agree with your findings at the preliminary hearing, I must emphasize that I respect your office and do inform you that I have adhered to your “no contact order.” But, on January 3, 2011, only for the legitimate purpose of collecting information to discuss with my attorney so that I can defend myself against the false charge of “criminal mischief” that occurred on July 27, 2010, while on my roof, I was AGAIN subjected to a round of harassment from Tina Myers—this time in direct violation of your “no contact order.”

The official definition of the word “communicates” as it occurs in Pennsylvania’s Criminal Code under the entry for 18 § 2709. Harassment, is defined in this way: "Communicates. Conveys a message without intent of legitimate communication…by…nonverbal…means…” It also defines “course of conduct” as a “pattern of actions composed of more than one act over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of conduct.” Your loophole should not be allowed to stand and you should personally see that Tina Myers is cited for “contempt.”

Pennsylvania’s Criminal Code “§ 2709.1. Stalking. (a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of stalking when the person…(2) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly communicates to another person under circumstances which demonstrate or communicate …an intent…to cause substantial emotional distress to such other person. (b) Venue.-- (1) An offense committed under this section may be deemed to have been committed at either the place at which the communication or communications were made or at the place where the communication or communications were received.”

On December 20, 2011, when I was being arraigned by your supervisor, Judge Williamson, he dispensed to me from his font of lawyerly wisdom, this piece of unsolicited advice: He advised me to get a lawyer “who knows what he is doing.” Soon, others involved in this case may need their own lawyers who had better have expertise in criminal defense and federal civil rights litigation.
Sincerely,
Jude René Montarsi
574 South Fairview Street
Lock Haven, PA 17745

Cc:
(1) Judicial Conduct Board
(2) Office of Disciplinary Counsel
(3) M. Carlson, Special Agent, Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email
(4) R. Drawbaugh, Special Agent, Public Corruptions Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email
(5) Dennis Boyle, Esquire via email
(6) Bart W. Holmes, Esquire via email
(7) Richard K. Parker via email
(8) www.MontarsiBlog.com

Enclosure. One photograph.

NY Times Editorial Nov 28, 2010--PA's "Untenable Judicial Ethics"

Published on-line November 27, 2010 edition of The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/opinion/28sun3.html

Untenable Judicial Ethics: Pennsylvania’s highest court,and the nation’s, should hold themselves to higher ethical standards.

"When Pennsylvania’s Chief Justice Ronald Castille came to New York City’s Waldorf Astoria last December for the 111th annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Society, a booster club for the state, a law firm picked up the $1,900 tab. As The Philadelphia Inquirer reported, that is one of many gifts of dinners, event tickets, golf outings and plane rides the chief justice has gotten, some from people with cases decided by his court.

Because the chief justice reported the gifts, the favors were not illegal. By the court’s standard, they were not unethical either. The court says it has the power to establish rules of ethics for state lawyers and judges. All state judges (not dealing with minor cases) can accept any gifts if they disclose them.

Almost no other state follows this policy. Neither should Pennsylvania. It permits violations of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Judicial Conduct, by casting doubt on judges’ “capacity to act impartially.”

Chief Justice Castille provides an ideal test of his court’s gift rule. According to The Inquirer, his votes in cases show “no pattern of favoritism.” In his 17 years on the court, he stated, “no party has sought recusal on the basis of my financial disclosures.” Mr. Castille, a former district attorney for Philadelphia, was awarded a Bronze Star and two Purple Hearts for his service in Vietnam.

But even a judge whose conduct seems above reproach can’t avoid doubt about his impartiality when he accepts gifts from lawyers and others with cases before him. A basic goal of a sensible gift rule is to free a judge from having to worry about whether he or she is influenced, without realizing it. Another is to assure citizens who depend on the court’s fairness that the judge can’t be influenced by anything but the essentials of a case.

Sadly, the Pennsylvania court is following a bad example, that of the United States Supreme Court. The justices are not subject to the code of conduct for federal judges, which has broad prohibitions about gifts for judges and their families. There is a growing consensus — outside the court — that the justices should change how they handle recusals: requiring a justice to explain any decision to recuse or not, and having a group of justices review each recusal decision.

Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court needs to change its ethics rules. So does the nation’s. With tuning as needed, the United States Supreme Court should adopt and follow the same ethics rules as every other federal court."

COMMENT: Now we can see why Conahan and Ciaverlla in Luzerne County, and Williamson and Miller (yet to be nabbed) in Clinton, are ethically challenged an wreck lives and economies. They take their cue from Chief Justice Castille. Unfortunately, unlike the chief justice, these crooks--and that's what they are--cannot claim that “no party has sought recusal". Read "Yaw Yaw" and smell the Feese and Facey the music! And when Chief Justice Castille's protege, Justice Orie-Melvin (of Melvin vs Doe infamy, whose sisters--including Senator Jane Orie, who sits on the senate judiciary committee and have been indicted by a grand jury on numerous counts of ethical violations involving Justice Melvin's run for the state supreme court)...finishes gerrymandering the electoral disticts in Pennsylvania--you can be damn sure we'll be living in a full-blown police state.

From what I have seen during the past ten years, I don't think it is a stretch to say that Pennsylvania's judiciary (along with a good portion of our legislature and the Pennsylvania Bar Association) could be considered a "criminal enterprise"!

At the present time, the judiciary poses the strongest threat to our democractic processes and to the undermining of our Commonwealth's Constitution. In the 1830s, a Bucks County judge ruled against African Americans in a case that was later used in the 1838 state constitutional convention to strip freed slaves and free born Pennsylvania men of African descent of their right to vote--in effect, rendering their citizenship meaningless. It was nearly 40 years later--with the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, that black men in this state had their right to vote restored. Watch what Castille and his cronies--will incrementally--make of our constitution with their gerrymandering via judicial decree of our electoral districts in the next few years. If your not queasy yet, then perhaps you will be after the chemicals in the water table from all hydrofracking seep into your water supply! "Yaw Yaw!"

Cronyism and favortism can exist anywhere, in both free and not-so-free states. In general, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are more vulnerable to acts of cronyism simply because the officeholders are not accountable, and all office holders generally come from a similar background (e.g., all members of the ruling party--READ: The Bar Association!)

Notwithstanding the fact that ethical lawyers do exist and practice in the Commonwealth, the "ethically challenged" amongst them are growing in number and have hijacked our government while undermining the ethical standards of the legal profession. The sociopaths amongst them are not interested in "self-policing," as evidenced by the Luzerne County "Kids for Cash" Scandal. Ugly, self-righteous, political THUGS!

We must begin to purge the judiciary of the sociopaths and root out their cronies in the executive and legislative branch on our own. There are other things too that we can do to ensure that Pennsylvanians can have access to clean courts—one would simply to vote against retaining all sitting judges until the judicial election process is reformed in this state. For more information, see below:
Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts - http://www.pmconline.org/


HALT (Help Abolish Legal Tyranny)- An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform, Inc. - http://www.halt.org/about_halt/

Clinton County: A Pattern of Judicial Ethics Violations

J-A02001-03
2003 PA Super 267

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant

v.

GILBERT JEFFREY STEVENSON, JR.,

Appellee: No. 965 MDA 2002

Appeal from the Order Entered June 10, 2002
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County
Criminal at No. 70-02 CR

BEFORE: STEVENS, OLSZEWSKI, and POPOVICH, JJ.
OPINION BY STEVENS, J.: Filed: July 17, 2003

1 The Commonwealth appeals the order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County on June 10, 2002, denying the Commonwealth’s motion for recusal. We reverse and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this decision.

2 On March 2, 2002, Defendant Stevenson was charged with one (1) count of fleeing or attempting to allude a police officer, three (3) counts of recklessly endangering another person, one (1) count of driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked/DUI related, and various summary traffic offenses. At Defendant’s May 20, 2002 arraignment, the Honorable J. Michael Williamson, who presided over the matter, stated, inter alia, the following:

This Court is aware that [Defendant] Mr. Stevenson is involved in a group of people who have had contact by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the Attorney General, the Drug Task Forces involved in the tri-county area, and various other agencies attempting to enter into deals with those defendants who provide information about this Judge and various criminal activities that the Federal Bureau of Investigation apparently feels I’m involved in. I make that statement because it seems to me that both the Commonwealth and the Defendant should be given an opportunity to ask me to recuse myself; the Commonwealth because, frankly, I have some personal concerns with regard to my involvement in Criminal cases in the future in which confidential informants or people who are cooperating with the government are involved because I am aware that I am not involved in any criminal activities and I continue to be appalled and affronted by the actions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in conducting this witch hunt. On the other hand, the Defendant, I think, has a right for recusal because the Defendant may very well feel that I am compelled to treat him more harshly than I would ordinarily in order to convince these authorities that I am not, in fact, involved with either this Defendant or in criminal activities. N.T. 5/20/02.

3 When questioned by the court as to whether the parties wanted the case transferred to another judge, both declined. Thereafter, however, by motion filed June 7, 2002, the Commonwealth sought recusal of Judge Williamson from Mr. Stevenson’s case.1 The court denied the motion on June 10, 2002. The Commonwealth then filed the present appeal.

4 Herein, the Commonwealth sets forth two claims for review. First, it contends that the court erred in denying the motion for recusal. Next, it argues that Judge Williamson should be recused from all criminal matters as a result of his perceived prejudice.

5 The initial question before us is whether the order from which the Commonwealth seeks review is appealable. The Commonwealth argues that it is appealable and invokes Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) and Pa.R.A.P. 313 in support thereof. 2

6 Turning first to Rule 311(d), this rules state as follows:

(d) Commonwealth Appeals in Criminal Cases. In a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution. Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).

7 With regard to Rule 311(d), the Commonwealth contends that “there are grave questions about the integrity of the process, and as a result, the prosecution of [Defendant’s] case is substantially handicapped.” Response filed 7/24/02. In the recent opinion of this Court in Commonwealth v. White, 818 A.2d 555 (Pa.Super. 2003) this Court determined whether the Commonwealth may appeal, as of right, a pretrial order denying recusal. The Court held as follows: “We decline to expand Rule 311(d) to include an appeal from an order denying recusal. We find that such an order is beyond the scope of Rule 311(d) and, therefore, is not appealable as of right.” Id. at 559 (footnote omitted 3). As such, the Commonwealth’s claim premised on this Rule is without merit.

1 We note that Defendant Stevenson has filed a brief in which he states, inter alia, that he joins in the Commonwealth’s motion for recusal, and does not oppose the recusal of Judge Williamson.

8 As to the second rule upon which the Commonwealth’s appeal is premised, Rule 313, this Rule provides as follows:

(a) General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right
from a collateral order of an administrative agency or lower
court.

(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable
from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right
involved is too important to be denied review and the question
presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment
in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.
Pa.R.A.P. 313.

9 This Court has held that orders denying a motion for recusal are not collateral and, therefore, are not immediately appealable. Krieg v. Kreig, 743 A.2d 509 (Pa.Super. 1999); Kenis v. Perini Corporation, 682 A.2d 845 (Pa.Super. 1996). However, cases that have held as such are factually distinguishable in that the party seeking recusal was not denied the right of appeal following disposition of the case. In the present case, however, as argued by the Commonwealth, it “will be precluded on double jeopardy grounds from seeking review of Its Motion for Recusal if the defendant is acquitted.” Response filed 7/24/02.

10 “Double jeopardy protections afforded by the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions are coextensive and prohibit repeated prosecutions for the same offense.” Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 467, 610 A.2d 7, 8 (1992) (citations omitted). If a former prosecution results in either acquittal or conviction, statutory law explicitly precludes the Commonwealth from trying a defendant a second time. Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 540 Pa. 460, 470, 658 A.2d 755, 760 (1995) (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110). Thus, if the Commonwealth loses in a case, double
jeopardy considerations preclude appeal. In contrast, a defendant convicted under an erroneous pre-trial ruling retains the right to cure the defect on appeal.

11 Consequently, in the case sub judice, we find that the order denying the Commonwealth’s motion for recusal is appealable under Rule 313. Thus, we will review the motion and the determination rendered by the trial court thereon.

12 The Supreme Court has held that:

It is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce
evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a
substantial doubt as to the jurist’s ability to preside impartially.
As a general rule, a motion for recusal is initially directed to and
decided by the jurist whose impartiality is being challenged. In
considering a recusal request, the jurist must first make a
conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the
case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in
the outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or her
continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of
impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in
the judiciary. This is a personal and unreviewable decision that
only the jurist can make. Where a jurist rules that he or she can
hear and dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that
decision will not be overturned on appeal but for an abuse of
discretion.

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 553 Pa. 485, 507, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (1998) (internal citations omitted). The inquiry is not whether a jurist was in fact biased against a party, but whether, even if actual bias or prejudice is lacking, the conduct or statement of the court raises “an appearance of impropriety.” In the Interest of McFall, 533 Pa. 24, 34, 617 A.2d 707, 712 (1992). The rule is simply that “disqualification of a judge is mandated whenever ‘a significant minority of the lay community could reasonably question the court’s impartiality.’” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 476 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa.Super. 1984) (citations omitted). See also Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C) (“A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned”).

13 Herein, in arguing that a reasonable question concerning Judge Williamson’s impartiality was raised at Defendant Stevenson’s arraignment, the Commonwealth cites to Judge Williamson’s statement that, “I have some personal concerns with regard to my involvement in criminal cases in the future in which confidential informants or people who are cooperating with
the government are involved. . . .” N.T. 5/20/02. The Commonwealth adds
that:

When a judge of a Court of Common Pleas in open court
and on the record makes a statement in a criminal matter that
the judge himself is under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the office of Attorney General, and other local law
enforcement agencies, and then proceeds to invite a motion for
recusal by both the Commonwealth and the defendant, that
judge has raised at the very least the perception, if not an
actual, prejudice and has certainly created a doubt as to his
ability to preside impartially.

Brief of Appellant at 7.

14 We find that Judge Williamson’s statement that he has personal concerns with regard to his involvement in criminal cases that involve confidential informants or people cooperating with the government raises both “doubt as to [Judge Williamson’s] ability to preside impartially,” Abu-Jamal, supra, and an “appearance of impropriety.” McFall, supra. Thus, the court abused its discretion in denying the Commonwealth’s motion for recusal. Consequently, we reverse the court’s order, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings regarding Mr. Stevenson’s case.

15 As to the Commonwealth’s second contention, based on the aforesaid comments of Judge Williamson, we hold he should be recused from all criminal matters concerning Mr. Stevenson; however, we do not extend this holding to all other criminal matters in which no evidence indicating Judge Williamson’s bias or unfairness has been presented.

16 Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

17 Reversed and Remanded to the Trial Court; Jurisdiction Relinquished.

Endnotes:

1 We note that Defendant Stevenson has filed a brief in which he states,
inter alia, that he joins in the Commonwealth’s motion for recusal, and does
not oppose the recusal of Judge Williamson.

2 By per curiam Order issued July 16, 2002, this Court directed the Commonwealth to show cause why the present appeal should not be quashed as taken from an unappealable, interlocutory order. Such response was filed on July 24, 2002.

3 We note that in White, this Court did not address whether an order pertaining to recusal is appealable under Rule 313.

PA Chief Justice Castille Objects to Judicial Nominations Made Despite Moratorium

The Legal Intelligencer
Amaris Elliott-Engel
October 08, 2010
http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202473135344#

Pennsylvania Chief Justice Ronald D. Castille is objecting to six judicial nominations made in the last two weeks by Gov. Edward G. Rendell despite a moratorium on appointments struck this spring between the two.

In May, Castille and Rendell agreed to keep some 20 vacant judgeships empty in an effort to save judicial funds. The only exception to the moratorium would be if a county court could convince Castille filling a judicial vacancy was necessary to manage caseloads.

In one letter sent Thursday to Rendell and in one letter sent Thursday to state Senate leaders, Castille said that no president judge of any county has asked the state Supreme Court to fill the vacancies. Castille wrote he could "only conclude that it is political pressure and not practical necessity that gives rise to these nominations."

The six nominations are for a Bucks County Common Pleas judgeship, a Philadelphia Common Pleas judgeship and Washington County Common Pleas judgeship, a Columbia County magisterial district judge, a Lancaster County magisterial district judge and a Lehigh County magisterial district judge.

Gary Tuma, Rendell’s press secretary, said today that the Rendell administration understood that state Sen. Dominic F. Pileggi, R-Delaware, the state Senate majority leader, had spoken to Castille and the two had agreed that six nominations should be considered.
"Our understanding is that Sen. Pileggi discussed these with the chief justice and these were going to move forward," Tuma said. "I’m not exactly sure where the breakdown is." Earlier in the week and before Castille’s letter came to light, Tuma had said the nominations were proceeding despite the moratorium because the need had been demonstrated to Castille.

Castille confirmed in an interview Friday that he had spoken with Pileggi, but Castille said that he told the senator that "if you’re under political pressure tell whoever the sponsor is to talk to the president judge and have the president judge talk to me."

Later, Castille added: "If it is accurate, if they really need the people and it can’t be handled by senior judges, then we might relent."

Erik Arneson, Pileggi's spokesman, wrote in an e-mail that "members representing those judicial districts, based on the information available to them, believe it is appropriate to fill these vacancies at this time. We will certainly consider the chief justice’s opinion prior to any final action on these nominations received from the governor. "

Castille sent Rendell a three-page letter April 27 requesting the freeze because, he wrote, the governor’s proposed budget has put the state’s judicial system in a "precarious financial position."

Read more about it in Monday's Legal.